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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The District of Columbia, as the site of the federal government, has the
greatest number of attorneys leaving government service for private prac-
tice.' This "revolving door" 2 movement by attorneys from the public sector
to the private sector creates a potential conflict of interest if attorneys subse-
quently become involved, on behalf of private litigants, with a government
agency or department which formerly employed them. Consequently, the
District of Columbia Bar (D.C. Bar) and the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals have played an active role in clarifying and amending the rules of
professional responsibility relevant to the revolving door. In Brown v. Dis-
trict of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment (Brown II), 3 the court of ap-
peals addressed this controversial problem.
Interest in the revolving door issue, however, is not limited to the profes-
sional legal community. The general public has an interest in an ethical gov-
ernment bureaucracy as well as in an ethical legal system.4 The public's
perception that lawyers abuse their government positions in order to gain
more lucrative employment in the private sector contributes to an overall
1. The "revolving door" of Washington, D.C. is particularly active in the zoning con-
text. Zoning Law Firms Make D.C. 's Experts Offers They Can't Refuse, Wash. Post, July 22,
1985, at Cl, col. 2; see Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 486 A.2d
37, 63 (D.C. 1984) (en banc) [hereinafter cited as Brown II. "[The revolving door problem]
has a special sensitivity in Washington, D.C., being, as it is, the seat of government. Most law
firms here continually hire or make partners of former government attorneys to gain their
expertise and experience and government contacts." Id.
2. "Revolving door" is a euphemism for the movement by attorneys from practice with
either the state or federal government to private practice. The most common scenario involves
government attorneys entering private practice in the same field or area of expertise. This is
especially true in specialized areas where the majority of the practice occurs before one agency,
giving rise to the so-called "federal regulatory bar." Laumann & Heinz, Washington Lawyers
and Others.: The Structure of Washington Representation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 465, 493 (1985).
In addition to its use as a euphemism, the court of appeals entitled its decision regarding the
amendments to the D.C. Code of Professional Responsibility, Revolving Door. See infra notes
15-28 and accompanying text.
3. 486 A.2d at 37. Prior to the Brown II decision, the court of appeals decided a related
issue in the same case. This case, Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment,
413 A.2d 1276 (D.C. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Brown I], will be discussed infra notes 49-54
and accompanying text.
4. Provisions in such acts as the Freedom of Information Act and Government in the
Sunshine Act of 1976, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985) and the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978, 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982) attest to such an interest.
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low public confidence in the legal profession.' In addition to the general
concern for the ethical behavior of government employees, the public also
has an interest in the efficient administration of justice. To the extent that
the revolving door is used as grounds for attorney disqualification motions, it
slows litigation and expends judicial resources.6
This Note will examine the content of the District of Columbia Code of
Professional Responsibility in light of the recent amendments.7 It will then
discuss the holding of the Brown II majority and the contentions of the dis-
senters.' Finally, this Note will conclude that the District of Columbia
Court of Appeal's en banc decision in Brown 11 unnecessarily restricted the
relevant disciplinary rule and failed to create a workable standard to guide
local law firms.
I. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
A. Relevant Ethical Rules
An ethical dispute dependent on the District's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility arose in Brown II when the plaintiff sought the disqualification
of two attorneys from a zoning dispute.9 To succeed, disqualification mo-
tions must detail a violation of the disciplinary rules of the District of Co-
lumbia Code of Professional Responsibility."0 In the revolving door context,
the relevant rule is Disciplinary Rule 101 of Canon 9 (DR 9-101), entitled
Avoiding Impropriety or the Appearance of Impropriety. "
In the District, this disciplinary rule had originally been identical to the
5. In the zoning context, which is the subject of Brown II, one member of the public
voiced this general concern by asking:
How early in their careers [do] these people decide they want lucrative positions in
the private sector[?] To what degree does the desire to ingratiate themselves with
those who are "watching them in action" influence the performance of their official
duties? Why does the District government permit this potentially abusive system to
continue?
Letter to the Editor, Wash. Post, July 27, 1985, at A22, col. 5.
6. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently commented on
"the proliferation of disqualification motions and the use of such motions for purely tactical
reasons, such as delaying the trial." Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 437 (2d Cir. 1980)
(en banc), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
7. Revolving Door, 445 A.2d 615 (D.C. 1982). See infra notes 15-28 and accompanying
text.
8. See infra notes 55-77 and accompanying text.
9. Brown II, 486 A.2d at 40 n.1.
10. Brown II arose under the D.C. Code prior to any amendments. The court, however,
noted that the new rule was not intended to alter substantively subsections (A) and (B) and
hence "the result would be the same if the new rule were applicable." Id.
11. D.C. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101 (1982).
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American Bar Association disciplinary rule.12 As of April 1982, however,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted the following version of
DR 9-101:
DR 9-101 Avoiding Impropriety or the Appearance of Impropriety
(A) A lawyer shall not state or imply that he or she is able to
influence improperly, or upon grounds irrelevant to a proper deci-
sion on the merits, any tribunal, legislative body or legislator, or
public official.
(B) A lawyer shall not at any time accept private employment in
connection with any matter in which he or she participated person-
ally and substantially as a public officer or employee, which in-
cludes acting on the merits of matter in a judicial capacity. 3
The District of Columbia Committee on Legal Ethics was a moving force
behind the revision of the District's Professional Responsibility Code.' 4 The
court of appeals discussed and published amendments to the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility in a decision titled Revolving Door. 15 The amendments
to the Code revised the disciplinary rules of canon 9 as well as a disciplinary
rule of canon 5 which was relevant to the revolving door issue.' 6 These
changes played an extensive role in Brown 11 and hence deserve further
explanation.
In 1979, the District of Columbia Committee on Legal Ethics, via the
Board of Governors of the D.C. Bar, petitioned the court of appeals "to
make comprehensive changes in canon 5 to provide clearer guidance to for-
mer government attorneys and their firms."' 7 After extensive debate' 8 and
12. The American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility Discipli-
nary Rule 9-101 states:
DR 9-101 Avoiding Even the Appearance of Impropriety.
(A) A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter upon the merits of
which he has acted in a judicial capacity.
(B) A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had sub-
stantial responsibility while he was a public employee.
(C) A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence improperly or upon
irrelevant grounds any tribunal, legislative body, or public official.
ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101 (1981).
13. Revolving Door, 445 A.2d at 617.
14. Id. at 616.
15. 445 A.2d 615 (D.C. 1982). To clarify, Disciplinary Rule 9-101 was directly relevant
to Brown H as the basis of the disqualification motion. Additionally, Disciplinary Rule 9-102
which addresses imputed disqualification was indirectly related to Brown II because its effect
became a point of dispute between the majority and dissenting opinions. See infra notes 71-74
and accompanying text.
16. Revolving Door, 445 A.2d at 616. The D.C. Committee on Legal Ethics intended the
changes to completely restructure the revolving door rules.
17. D.C. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 84 (Jan. 23, 1980).
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several false starts,' 9 the court of appeals denied the petition of the Board of
Governors with the exception of the revisions of DR 5-105(D), and DR 9-
101, DR 9-102, and DR 9-103.2 0  The adopted proposals contained proce-
dures that, if followed, would halt vicarious disqualification of entire law
firms. 21 Specifically, under DR 9-102(C) of the District of Columbia Profes-
sional Responsibility Code, the law firm must screen the attorney at risk
from any form of participation in the matter and notify the affiliated agency
18. Revolving Door, 445 A.2d at 616 ("[H]undreds of written critiques" were filed ith the
court.).
19. See appendices A and B of Revolving Door, 445 A.2d 615 (D.C. 1982).
20. Id. at 622.
21. District of Columbia Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 9-102
governs the vicarious disqualification of entire firms. The amended version follows:
DR 9-102 Imputed Disqualification of Partners, Associates, and Of Counsel
Lawyers.
(A) If a lawyer is required to decline or to withdraw from employment under DR 9-
101 (B), on account of personal and substantial participation in a matter other than as
a law clerk, no partner or associate of that lawyer, or lawyer with an of counsel
relationship to that lawyer, may accept or continue such employment except as pro-
vided in (B) and (C) below.
(B) The prohibition stated in DR 9-102(A) shall not apply if the personally disquali-
fied lawyer is screened from any form of participation in the matter or representation
as the case may be, and from sharing in any fees resulting therefrom.
(C) When any of counsel lawyer, partner or associate of a lawyer personally disqual-
ified under DR 9-101(B) accepts employment in connection with the matter giving
rise to the personal disqualification, or when the fact and subject matter of such
employment are otherwise disclosed on the public record, whichever occurs later, the
following notifications shall be required: (1) The personally disqualified lawyer shall
file with the public department or agency and serve on each other party to any perti-
nent proceeding a signed document attesting that during the period of his or her
disqualification the personally disqualified lawyer will not participate in any manner
in the matter or the representation, will not discuss 'he matter or the representation
with any partner, associate, or of counsel lawyer, and will not share in any fees for
the matter or the representation. (2) At least one affiliated lawyer shall file with the
same department or agency and serve on the same parties a signed document attest-
ing that all affiliated lawyers are personally aware of the requirement that the person-
ally disqualified lawyer be screened from participating in or discussing the matter or
the representation and describing the procedures being taken to screen the personally
disqualified lawyer.
(D) Signed documents filed pursuant to DR 9-102(C) shall be public except to the
extent that a lawyer submitting a signed document shows that disclosure is inconsis-
tent with Canon 4 or provisions of law.
(E) When the fact and subject matter of a client's employment of any of counsel
lawyer, partner or associate of a lawyer personally disqualified under DR 9-101(B)
has been otherwise disclosed to the public department or agency but not to the gen-
eral public, the signed documents required by DR 9-102(C) shall be filed only with
the public department or agency to which such disclosure has been made and shall
not be served on any other person. So long as disclosure has not been otherwise
made on the public record, the public department or agency shall keep the signed
documents confidential.
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or department that all involved attorneys are aware of the screening require-
ments.22 This procedure for screening-off an attorney is commonly referred
to as "building a Chinese Wall." 23 The screened attorney also has to submit
a signed document that attests to his or her intention not to participate.24
Despite the amendments to DR 9-101, the court of appeals Revolving Door
decision did not state definitively what constitutes the same "matter" for
purposes of the disciplinary rule. "Matter" is the pivotal term in DR 9-
101(B) which requires that a lawyer decline private employment "in connec-
tion with any matter in which he or she participated personally and substan-
tially as a public officer or employee.",25 Consequently, if a court defines a
series of episodes with the government and a private party as the same mat-
ter, the attorney will be disqualified from the case. The Revolving Door deci-
sion, therefore, encourages law firms to use their own initiative in order to
determine whether or not a lawyer may violate DR 9-101 because of prior
government service. Otherwise, if a firm waits for the court's interpretation
of "matter" and the possible subsequent disqualification, it will be too late to
use the screening mechanism to avoid imputed disqualification of the re-
mainder of the law firm.26 Hence, law firms probably choose to screen, as a
precautionary move, ex-government attorneys in close cases in order to
avoid the possibility of later vicarious disqualification of the entire firm.
From an economic standpoint, it behooves firms to err on the "ethical" side.
The only concrete example of "matter" included within the Disciplinary
Rule is "acting on the merits in a judicial capacity."27 The amendments to
the Code, however, define "matter" as including "any judicial or other pro-
ceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract,
22. D.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102(C)(2) (1982).
23. The "Chinese Wall" concept was first created in Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975). ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975) followed this case and somewhat lessened the weight of
the disqualification sanction because it allowed firms to screen the ex-government lawyer from
direct and indirect participation in a conflict of interest case. The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals relied on ABA Formal Op. 342 in Committee for Washington's Riverfront Parks v.
Thompson, 451 A.2d 1177 (D.C. 1982).
24. D.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102(C)(1) (1982).
25. D.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(B) (1982) (emphasis
added).
26. The court described the typical scenario and the effect of DR 9-101:
[t]he private firm already has (or may wish to accept) a client involved in a matter
which the lawyer was involved with on the other side while with the government.
Thus, if the lawyer's own disqualification is not to be imputed to the private firm,
there is a need to insulate that lawyer from his or her firm's participation in the
matter, in order to prevent any actual or apparent impropriety.
Revolving Door, 445 A.2d at 616.
27. D.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(B) (1982).
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claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particu-
lar matter involving a specific party or parties. ',28 The flexibility of the defi-
nition, however, leaves ample room for judicial disagreements over the scope
of episodes that fall within the prohibitions against representing a private
party on the same matter. Amidst this background the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals again entered the field of professional responsibilty and
decided, in Brown I, what methodology should be employed to define what
constitutes "matter., 29 As will be discussed further, the court's opinion
lessened the incentive for firms to err in favor of screening by creating a
rebuttable prima facie standard.3° In other words, by making it harder to
support a disqualification motion under DR 9-101(2), the court decreased
the incentive for law firms to screen preventively close cases of potential ex-
government attorney conflict.
B. Policy Choices
The court of appeals' application of DR 9-101(B) in Brown H involved a
policy choice between: (1) a narrow interpretation of "matter" and the con-
sequent limited scope of DR 9-101(B); or (2) a broader interpretation of
"matter" that would encompass a greater number of revolving door inci-
dents.3 ' The definition of "matter" in DR 9-101 affects not only law firm
economics but also important public interests. For example, a very narrow
definition of "matter" would preclude the bulk of disqualifications of ex-
government attorneys. In turn, this would increase the amount of move-
ment between the public and private sector, and would result in the follow-
ing benefits: first, no permanent legal bureacracy would be created;32
second, the government would have an easier time recruiting attorneys;33
28. Revolving Door, 445 A.2d at 618.
29. Brown II, 486 A.2d at 49.
30. See infra notes 62-65.
31. See ABA Comm. on Ethics, and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975)
and D.C. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 16 (1976). See generally Developments in the Law-
Conflicts of Interest Second in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1428-39 (1981);
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The presiding judge in
Standard Oil, Kaufman, authored an article discussing the case, Kaufman, The Former Gov-
ernment Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1957);
32. See Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1428. The assumption of the article is
that a permanent legal bureaucracy would be inefficient and counter-productive "because they
would be relatively insulated from external pressures for flexibility and change, their approach
to policymaking would tend to be more rigid and conservative." Id. at 1429.
33. Standard Oil, 136 F. Supp. at 363 (The government must constantly recruit attorneys
from private practice. A strict interpretation of the scope of canon 9 might result in young
attorneys avoiding government service because it would adversely restrict their future career
opportunities.). The government itself claimed this interest in Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625
F.2d 433, 443 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). The court commented:
1230 [Vol. 35:1225
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third, the one-time government agency lawyer might serve as a conduit of
information to regulated entities (who are their clients) and increase the effi-
ciency of the regulatory process;34 and finally, little or no regulation of ethi-
cal issues may further the right to counsel of choice.
On a practical level, any decision on professional responsibility has eco-
nomic consequences for all law firms and lawyers with past government ser-
vice. As the Brown II dissent pointed out, "Any disciplinary rule which
potentially may impinge upon this flow of experienced legal talent to private
practice understandably would send tremors through the top levels of local
law firms."35 Specifically, the law firms might curtail the recruitment of at-
torneys away from government service and institute extensive screening pro-
cedures. The court's decision in Brown II set the standard upon which law
firms will decide the necessity of a "Chinese Wall."
In addition to the economic considerations, substantial movement of at-
torneys between the public and private sectors erodes an already low public
confidence in the judicial system.36 Public suspicion of unethical behavior
may be based on a variety of factors. For example, there may be the appear-
ance of misuse of government information3 7 or the perception of favoritism
by government agencies to ex-employees and their clients.38 The public may
While the tone of these assertions may be overly apocalyptic, it is true that a decision
rejecting the efficacy of screening procedures in this context may have significant
adverse consequences. Thus, such disapproval may hamper the government's efforts
to hire qualified attorneys; the latter may fear that government service will transform
them into legal "Typhoid Marys," shunned by prospective private employers because
hiring them may result in the disqualification of an entire firm in a possibly wide
range of cases. The amici also contend that those already employed by the govern-
ment may be unwilling to assume positions of greater responsibility within the gov-
ernment that might serve to heighten their undesirability to future private employers.
Certainly such trends, if carried to an extreme, may ultimately affect adversely the
quality of the services of government attorneys.
Id. at 443; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342, at
4 (1975).
34. Laumann & Heinz, supra note 2, at 483-85.
35. Brown II, 486 A.2d at 63.
36. See, e.g., Brackel, Pro Se, 14 A.B.A. STUDENT LAW., Feb. 1986, at 38 ("From Shake-
speare to Dickens to today's mere mortal critics . . . . the next most ancient profession has
come in for some truly scathing commentary.").
37. See Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1431 ("A second danger of the revolv-
ing door involves ... protection of client confidences. Former officials could benefit improp-
erly from their government employment by abusing their knowledge of confidential
information."). In Brown AI, the court addressed the confidentiality issue under canon 4 of the
D.C. Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 4 deals with preserving client confidences
and avoiding conflicts of interest. See Brown 11, 486 A.2d at 42-44. This Note, however,
focuses primarily upon the court's treatment of the "concerns in addition to confidentiality"
involved in the revolving door issue. Id. at 44.
38. See Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1432. "The principal concern is that a
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also suspect that government attorneys channel public resources in a manner
designed to further their future career prospects. 39 All of these appearance-
related disadvantages will exist to a limited degree unless there is a total
closure of the revolving door.4 The court's interpretation of DR 9-101(B),
former top official in an agency might receive special deference from former subordinates who
are used to treating that individual with special respect." Id.
39. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
40. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (1982) represents a legisla-
tive determination that such a closure of the revolving door should be imposed for a one year
period for specified officials. 18 U.S.C. § 207 states:
Disqualification of former officers and employees disqualification of partners of cur-
rent officers and employees
(a) Whoever, having been an... employee of... any independent agency.., or of
the District of Columbia .... after his employment has ceased, knowingly acts as
agent or attorney for, or otherwise represents, any other person (except the United
States), in any formal or informal appearance before, or, with the intent to influence,
makes any oral or written communication on behalf of any other person (except the
United States) to-
(1) any department, agency, court, court-martial, or any civil, military, or naval
commission of the United States or the District of Columbia, or any officer or
employee thereof, and
(2) in connection with any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for
a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation,
charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter involving a specific party or
parties in which the United States or the District of Columbia is a party or has a
direct and substantial interest, and
(3) in which he participated personally and substantially as an officer or em-
ployee through decision, approval, disapproval, recomendation, the rendering of
advice, investigation, or otherwise, while so employed, or
(b) Whoever, (i) having been so employed within two years after his employment
has ceased, knowingly acts as agent or attorney for, or otherwise represents, any
other person (except the United States), in any formal or informal appearance before,
or, with the intent to influence, makes any oral or written communication on behalf
of any other person (except the United States) to, or (ii) having been so employed and
as specified in subsection (d) of this section, within two years after his employment
has ceased, knowingly represents or aids, counsels, advises, counsults, or assists in
representing any other person (except the United States) by personal presence at any
formal or informal appearance before-
(1) any department, agency, court, courtmartial, or any civil, military or naval
commission of the United States or the District of Columbia, or any officer or
employee thereof, and
(2) in connection with any judicial or other proceeding, aplication, request for a
ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge,
accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties in
which the United States or the District of Columbia is a party or has a direct and
substantial interest, and
(3) as to (i), which was actually pending under his official responsibilty as an
officer or employee within a period of one year prior to the termination of such
responsibility, or, as to (ii), in which he participated personally and substantially as
an officer or employee; ....
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however, reflected a policy evaluation of the relative importance of public
confidence in the judicial system and the economic consequences to area law
firms.
II. THE IMPACT OF BROWN II ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The Brown II decision acted as a vehicle for the court of appeals' assess-
ment of the revolving door issue. The court fully examined the inherent
policy choices in the regulation of the revolving door and the majority con-
cluded that the risk of decreased public confidence did not justify disqualifi-
cation of the two private attorneys on the present facts.4 The dissent
vehemently disagreed and characterized the majority opinion as "excessively
solicitous of the law firms."42
A. The Tortured Route of Brown II
As noted previously, the Brown II disqualification decision occurred in a
zoning conflict involving Oliver T. Car, Washington's "premier devel-
oper,"43 and his development called the Westbridge. In chronological order,
the following events set the stage for Brown I. In April, 1975 Carr success-
fully challenged, on constitutional grounds, the Zoning Commission's sixty-
foot height limitation on any construction at the Westbridge site. The Zon-
ing Commission's attorney in this episode was Iverson Mitchell.' Six
months later, in October 1975, Carr instructed his attorneys to inquire about
the legality of an air rights condominium at the Westbridge. Another zoning
attorney, C. Francis Murphy, as well as Mitchell, participated in the conver-
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years or
both: ....
Id. Section (c) did not apply in Brown II because both attorneys in question had left govern-
ment service before the provision was enacted. Brown I, 486 A.2d at 46 n. 12. Perhaps the
majority's concern over the punitive element of disqualification (unjustified according to the
dissent), may be related to the existence of this provision.
41. The court of appeals foreshadows its final decision by its characterization of the
choices:
One could argue, of course, that the prophylactic effect of DR 9-101(B) should be
extended-in the spirit of § 207(c)-to cover appearances that do not necessarily
reflect established or likely corruption of the subsequent litigation. The only basis for
doing so, however, would be a policy judgment that, despite the absence of any preju-
dicial relationship between a government transaction and a former government attor-
ney's later work for a private client, the attorney's government reputation, expertise,
and contacts should, for the sake of appearances, be kept from the new private client.
Brown I, 486 A.2d at 46-47.
42. Id. at 75.
43. Carr Buys Old Hecht's Property, Wash. Post, Jan. 7, 1986, at BI, col. 4.
44. Brown I, 486 A.2d at 40.
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sations and correspondence surrounding the Westbridge air rights issue.
The idea was subsequently dropped for nonlegal reasons.45
In 1976, Wilkes, Artis, Hedrick & Lane (Wilkes and Artis), a large Wash-
ington law firm specializing in zoning, hired both Mitchell and Murphy
upon their departure from practice with the Corporation Counsel.46 One
year later, Carr hired Wilkes and Artis to pursue a special exception for
more underground parking at the Westbridge. Wilkes and Artis failed to
screen Murphy and Mitchell from participation in the Carr parking case.47
Consequently, when the parking exception pursuit resulted in hearings
before the Board of Zoning Adjustment, the plaintiff moved for disqualifica-
tion of both attorneys and the entire law firm because of violations of DR 9-
101(B).48
At this juncture, the Board of Zoning Adjustment held a hearing on the
disqualification motion. The Board, however, refused to disqualify the law-
yers on the ground that the Board did not have the authority to regulate the
legal practice before it.49 The petitioner appealed to the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals. In Brown v. Board of Zoning Adjustment (Brown I),
the court remanded the case back to the Board, stating that the Board had
both the power and obligation to regulate the legal practice before it.5"
In Brown I, the court refrained from deciding the merits of the case but it
did offer "some guidance" to the Board.51 The court stressed that one of the
policies behind the disciplinary rules of canon 9 is "to avoid even the appear-
ance of impropriety." '52 The court stated later that the Board of Zoning
must consider the appearance of wrongdoing even if no actual conflict has
been found. 3 The court articulated a three step analysis: First, do the items
constitute the same matter? If so, did the attorneys have substantial respon-
sibility for either of the previous transactions? Finally, should Wilkes and
45. Id.
46. Id. Both Murphy and Mitchell were employed by Corporation Counsel that served as
the provider of legal services to the Board of Zoning Adjustment. For a discussion of the
benefits of hiring from government practice, see Zoning Law Firms Make D. C. 's Experts Offers
They Can't Refuse, Wash. Post, July 22, 1985, at BI, col. 5. As one hiring attorney stated,
"You have the added opportunity of watching them in action." Id. at C5, col. 4.
47. Brown 11, 486 A.2d at 40 n.2.
48. Id. at 41. Brown, the plaintiff, had an interest in the proceedings as an affected resi-
dent. He argued, through counsel, that Murphy and Mitchell had violated DR 9-101(B) be-
cause their past employment with the Zoning Commission had encompassed work on the same
matter as presently under discussion, namely, the Westbridge building. Brown , 413 A.2d at
1278.
49. Brown I, 413 A.2d at 1279.
50. Id. at 1285.
51. Id. at 1282.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1283.
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Artis be disqualified as an entity?54
Despite these admonitions by the court of appeals in Brown I, the Board
of Zoning considered the case on remand, and again refused to disqualify the
attorneys and the law firm of Wilkes & Artis." The findings from this ad-
ministrative hearing became the factual basis of the majority's holding in
Brown II. "
After the Board's refusal to disqualify, the case again went up on appeal,
now as Brown II, and a division of the court reversed the Board, ruling as a
matter of law, that the parking exception case constituted the same "matter"
under DR 9-101.57 The court then granted the respondent's petition for a
rehearing en banc, and the full court reversed the panel's holding and af-
firmed the Board's refusal to disqualify.58
B. The Rebuttable Prima Facie Case
The Brown H case thoroughly examined the revolving door ethical di-
lemma. The crux of the disagreement between the majority and the dissent
was the desirability of easy movement from public to private practice. The
majority opinion analyzed the issue of whether the "substantial relationship"
test suffices in the revolving door context.59 Briefly stated, the substantial
54. Id. at 1282. The court mentioned that the law firm of Wilkes & Artis should not be
disqualified if they had adequately screened Murphy and Mitchell; or, in the alternative, Cor-
poration Counsel had waived its right to protest. Id. at 1284. In Brown II, the court never
progressed beyond the first question because it determined that the transactions were not the
same matter. Brown II, 486 A.2d at 54-59 (D.C. 1984).
55. Brown II, 486 A.2d at 41.
56. Id. at 52-53. The court concluded that the factual findings should be upheld even if
the Board applied an incorrect legal framework: "But, even if the BZA did not apply the
substantially related test, its findings are explicit enough and sufficiently supported by record
evidence to permit this court [to apply the correct legal standard]." Id. at 53. For a discussion
of the "substantially related" test, see infra note 59.
57. Brown II, 486 A.2d at 41 (citing Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning
Adjustment, No. 13,670 (D.C. July 15, 1983)) (unpublished panel decision prior to en banc
review which held that the three episodes constituted the same matter under DR 9-101(B)).
58. Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, No. 13,670 (D.C. filed
Sept. 29, 1983) (order granting rehearing en banc).
59. Brown II, 486 A.2d at 41-50. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals had previ-
ously endorsed the "substantial relationship" test for DR 9-101 in Committee for Washing-
ton's Riverfront Parks v. Thompson, 451 A.2d 1177 (D.C. 1982). In other words, to define
whether two episodes or incidents were the same "matter", the court would look to whether
the episodes were substantially related. The Thompson case adopted the ABA's definition of
"matter": "a discrete and isolatable transaction or set of transactions between identifiable
parties." Id. at 1188 (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 342, at 6 (1975) (footnotes omitted). The court did not disqualify the attorneys involved
because "the design at issue... [was] distinct from the proposal and guidelines." Id. at 1190.
The court stated further that "even if an actual conflict of interest is not present we must
consider whether the possibility that insider information relevant to the particular matter in
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relationship test evolved in the side-switching context to prevent misuse of
confidential information. The test originally announced in TC. Theatre
Corp. v. Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc. " is as follows: "where any substan-
tial relationship can be shown between the subject matter of a former repre-
sentation and that of a subsequent adverse representation, the latter will be
prohibited."6
The majority held that in the revolving door context DR 9-101(B) re-
quires a "few refinements" in order to effectuate adequately its emphasis on
the appearance of impropriety, as opposed to actual impropriety.62 The
court characterized its action as broadening the scope of the substantial rela-
tionship test,6" in creating a prima facie case for disqualification under DR
9-101(B) that is satisfied if the "transactions overlap in such a way that a
reasonable person could infer that the former government attorney may have
had access to information legally relevant to, or otherwise useful in, the sub-
sequent representation." '  This test is also known as the "useful informa-
tion" test.
This test covers the appearance of impropriety prong of canon 9. Yet the
court then proceeded to allow rebuttal of the prima facie case by proof that
the appearance was deceiving and the attorney did not actually have access
to the useful information.65 Hence, the court retreated from implementing
its prima facie case on the appearance of impropriety prong and instead
sought to prevent only actual impropriety.
In the process, the majority opinion rejected the proposal offered by the
controversy was obtained through prior government employment presents the appearance of
impropriety." Id. at 1188 (citing Kessenick v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 684
F.2d 88 (D.C. Cir. 1982)) (emphasis in original). So unlike Brown II, the flow of information
need not cause prejudice for it to be the basis of disqualification.
60. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd, 216 F.2d 920 (2d. Cir. 1954).
61. Id. at 268 (footnote omitted).
62. Brown II, 486 A.2d at 49.
63. Id. at 50. The court believed their "useful information" test was broader than the
traditional "substantial relationship" test because theoretically two incidents which were not
at all related and would not qualify under the latter might still contain enough overlapping
information that was either legally relevant or useful so as to qualify under the court's new
test. Id. at 50 n.17.
64. Id. at 49-50.
65. Id. at 52. The court stated:
[T]he three land use transactions.., provide a sufficient factual overlap for a reason-
able person to infer that Iverson Mitchell and C. Francis Murphy, while attorneys
for the District, may have had access to information from the height litigation and
the air rights condominimum [sic] discussions that could be legally relevant to, or
otherwise useful in, the special exception case at issue here.
Id. Yet the court then proceeded to denigrate the importance of such reasonable inferences by
allowing rebuttal. The court, however, shifted the burden of rebutting the inferences to Wilkes
& Artis. Id.
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District of Columbia Committee on Legal Ethics.66 The Committee, as ami-
cus, suggested that " 'where transactions pertain to a single objective and
involve the same property and the same party, public concerns about the fair
administration of justice usually will support a determination that the trans-
actions are part of the same matter.' ,67 The majority denigrated this
straightforward test as being "too vague and wooden.",68 The majority opin-
ion stated that the amicus proposal "would completely shut the revolving
door" because it is directed at appearances rather than at the flow of useful
information.69 The majority implicitly decided that any possible lessening of
public confidence in the government does not merit interpreting DR 9-101 to
include appearance of impropriety unaccompanied by the flow of prejudicial
information.
The majority concluded that, "properly informed of the countervailing
concerns, the public would find the revolving door rules-protecting against
prejudicial use of government information-palatable" and "[tihis court
should expect no more than what the rules require."7 ° Such reasoning elic-
ited a vehement response from the dissent. The dissenting opinion charac-
terized the decision as "irresolute" and "backward-looking" and chastized
the majority for restraining the Bar's "effort to establish an .. .uplifting
standard of legal ethics."7 In short, the dissent viewed the majority opinion
as unnecessarily solicitous of law firms because the "useful information" test
transfers the emphasis from a judgment on the appearance of impropriety to
a quest for proof of actual misfeasance.72 In the dissent's view, a favorable
public perception of the judicial system must be considered an important
goal of DR 9-101 and hence the appearance of wrongdoing should be suffi-
cient grounds for disqualification.7 3 In support of its view, the dissent stated
that "the 'useful information' test is too protective in this jurisdiction where
we have a screening provision which avoids the heavy sanction [of vicarious
66. Id. at 50-52.
67. Id. at 50 (quoting amicus without citation).
68. Id. at 52.
69. Id. at 51-52.
70. Id. at 59.
71. Id. at 60.
72. Id. at 70, 75-76.
73. Id. at 69. The dissent considered the majority's fear that disqualification based on
appearance would "shut the door" as grossly inaccurate. Id. at 52. The dissent stated, "Be-
cause of the moderate screening provision-with the law firm remaining in the particular
case-there is no interference with the governmental hiring program due to future economic
inhibitions on attorneys considering government employment. The screening provision
removes any such problem." Id. at 64. For an explanation of the screening mechanism, see
supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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disqualification] against the law firm." 7 4
In sum, the majority and dissent have a vastly different perception of the
relationship between public confidence in the judicial system and the imple-
mentation of disciplinary rules. The majority characterized the public confi-
dence issue as beyond the realm of DR 9-101, and not a valid component of
the disqualification unless an actual flow of useful information accompanies
the improper appearance." On the other hand, the dissent argued that such
an approach eviscerates canon 9 and may call into question "the reliability
of our legal system."'76 On balance, the dissent correctly promoted the as-
pirational goals of the Code by reasoning that the practical difficulties have
already been mitigated by allowing firms to build the Chinese Wall and
thereby avoid economic penalties. 77 The majority failed to respond ade-
quately to the challenge posed by the dissent.
III. CONCLUSION
Brown II represents the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' latest
foray into the professional responsibility field, specifically into the "revolving
door" area. The case involved a zoning battle over a parking exception in
which the petitioner moved for the disqualification of two attorneys and
their law firm on the grounds that they had previously worked for the in-
volved government agency on substantially the same matter.
The majority of the court held that the attorneys should not be disquali-
fied because the past incidents were not sufficiently related to the parking
exception case and hence the attorneys could not have gained "useful infor-
mation" from their previous government work. The dissent, in contrast, ar-
gued that the appearance of impropriety should be sufficient grounds for
disqualification even if no misfeasance has occurred.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals' latest decision in the profes-
sional responsibility area in all probability will not curtail the proliferation of
litigation on disqualification motions. At first glance, the useful information
test and the prima facie case appear to create a uniform standard that would
encourage internal screening and discourage litigation. The ability to rebut
and the grounds sufficient for rebuttal, however, will probably encourage
more litigation in borderline cases.
Regarding the public's opinion of the legal profession, the effect of Brown
II will be negligible, at best, insofar as it will merely perpetuate the already
74. Brown II, 486 A.2d at 74.
75. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
76. Brown II, 486 A.2d at 72. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 5, 36, and accompanying text.
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low esteem in which attorneys are held. At worst, the decision will en-
courage verbal semantics to sidestep ethical issues and such behavior will
contribute to a further decline in respect for the legal profession.
Susan L. Burke

